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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_________ 
 
NO. 10-4345 
_________ 
 
 
DOROTHY AVICOLLI, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
 GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a/k/a GEICO; ANGELO CARTER; CHARLES CARTER 
 
_________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-02858) 
District Judge:  Hon. Legrome D. Davis 
_________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 11, 2011 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, FUENTES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 29, 2011) 
_________ 
 
 
 
OPINION 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Dorothy Avicolli appeals from the District Court‟s order granting the motion of 
the Government Employees Insurance Co. (“GEICO”) to dismiss Avicolli‟s Complaint 
for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Specifically, Avicolli 
challenges the District Court‟s conclusion that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:28-1.3, a New Jersey 
statute governing automobile insurance coverage, does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  We will affirm.  
I. 
Avicolli, a citizen and resident of Pennsylvania, suffered serious personal injuries 
after she was struck while a pedestrian in Pennsylvania by a car owned by Charles Carter 
and permissively operated by his son, both citizens and residents of New Jersey.  Charles 
Carter was insured under an automobile policy issued in New Jersey by GEICO.  Avicolli 
brought suit against the Carters for negligence, and against GEICO for bad faith and 
breach of contract based on GEICO‟s refusal to pay Avicolli personal injury protection 
(“PIP”) benefits under the insurance policy.1 
Avicolli received $15,000 in settlement of her claim against the Carters, the full 
amount of the liability coverage under the GEICO policy, while reserving her right to 
press her claims against GEICO for PIP benefits.  Although the GEICO policy contained 
PIP coverage of $250,000, it excluded nonresidents of New Jersey who were injured 
                                              
1
   New Jersey defines “[p]ersonal injury protection coverage” as the “[p]ayment of 
medical expense benefits in accordance with a benefit plan provided in the policy and 
approved by the commissioner, for reasonable, necessary, and appropriate treatment and 
provision of services to persons sustaining bodily injury, in an amount not to exceed 
$250,000 per person per accident.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:6A-4(a). 
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outside the state from receiving PIP benefits.  GEICO moved to dismiss Avicolli‟s 
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.  Avicolli responded 
by arguing that the New Jersey statute, § 17:28-1.3, which requires that PIP benefits be 
available to pedestrians injured in New Jersey but lacks a similar mandate for pedestrians 
injured outside New Jersey, was unconstitutional.  The District Court granted GEICO‟s 
motion, and Avicolli appeals.
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II. 
 Avicolli challenges § 17:28-1.3.  That section of the statute provides in relevant 
part: 
Every liability insurance policy issued in this State on a motor vehicle . . . 
insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily 
injury, death, and property damage sustained by any person arising out of 
the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle . . . shall 
provide personal injury protection coverage benefits . . . to pedestrians who 
sustain bodily injury in the State caused by the named insured's motor 
vehicle . . . or by being struck by an object propelled by or from the motor 
vehicle . . . . 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:28-1.3 (emphasis added). 
 Avicolli argues that § 17:28-1.3 unconstitutionally deprives a pedestrian injured 
outside New Jersey of the equal protection of the law by precluding that pedestrian, and 
not a pedestrian injured in New Jersey, from receiving PIP coverage.  The Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
prohibits a state from denying “any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
                                              
2
   The District Court had jurisdiction by virtue of the diversity of the parties under 28 
U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We conduct a plenary 
review over a district court‟s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  
Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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the laws.”  Because the statute does not trammel on fundamental rights and does not draw 
distinctions based on inherently suspect classifications such as race, religion, or alienage,  
it is evaluated under rational basis review.  City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 
303 (1976); Dyszel v. Marks, 6 F.3d 116, 125 (3d Cir. 1993).  Under this level of 
scrutiny, a law will be upheld if “the classification challenged [is] rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.”  Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303.  Put another way, “if there is any 
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the 
classification,” the statute will survive an equal protection challenge.  Dyszel, 6 F.3d at 
125 (internal quotation omitted). 
 Contrary to Avicolli‟s characterization, § 17:28-1.3 does not prohibit insurers from 
offering PIP coverage to pedestrians injured outside New Jersey.  Rather, it mandates that 
insurance policies issued in New Jersey provide PIP coverage to pedestrians injured in 
the state, and says nothing about pedestrians injured outside the state, leaving it to the 
insurer to decide whether to offer those pedestrians similar coverage. 
 The District Court rejected Avicolli‟s Fourteenth Amendment challenge to § 
17:28-1.3, reasoning that there are numerous reasonably conceivable legitimate state 
interests that support the statutory distinction between pedestrians injured by accidents 
occurring within and beyond New Jersey borders.  It stated: 
At the most basic level, the State of New Jersey has a legitimate interest in 
ensuring that individuals injured within its borders receive financial 
coverage for medical expenses.  Furthermore, provisions such as this fit 
within legislative schemes that have a host of positive effects that the 
legislature intends when it enacts them, including the reduction of litigation 
costs and the affordability of coverage to its citizenry. 
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Avicolli v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. et al., No. 2:10-cv-02858, slip op. at 14 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 
27, 2010). 
The District Court‟s analysis is persuasive.  In challenging the District Court‟s 
decision, Avicolli relies on the standard enunciated in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 
(1974), but the Supreme Court has since made clear that the proper standard for rational 
basis review is to inquire “„if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could 
provide a rational basis for the classification.‟”  Dyszel, 6 F.3d at 125 (quoting F.C.C. v. 
Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)); see also United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. 
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980); Coal. for Equal Rights, Inc. v. Ritter, 517 F.3d 1195, 
1200 (10th Cir. 2008). 
Avicolli also argues that the distinction in § 17:28-1.3 between in-state and out-of-
state collisions is not rationally related to the “primary purpose” of the New Jersey 
Automobile Reparation Reform Act of 1972 which is to effectuate “the prompt and 
efficient provision of benefits for all accident victims.”  Appellant‟s Br. at 19 (citing 
Gambino v. Royal Globe Ins. Cos., 429 A.2d 1039, 1042 (N.J. 1981) (“The reparation 
objective was viewed as the „primary purpose of an automobile insurance system‟ . . . .”) 
(citation omitted)); see N.J. Stat. Ann. 39:6A-1, et seq.  
In so arguing, Avicolli overlooks that although Gambino identified the reparation 
objective as the primary purpose of New Jersey‟s automobile insurance system at the 
time of the legislation‟s enactment, New Jersey‟s automobile insurance laws have since 
been amended in an effort to reduce insurance premiums for New Jersey motorists.  See 
Hardy ex rel. Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, 965 A.2d 1165, 1170 (N.J. 2009).  Indeed, § 
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17:28-1.3 was enacted as part of the New Jersey Automobile Insurance Freedom of 
Choice and Cost Containment Act of 1984, the purpose of which was “the reduction in 
private insurance costs, not the expansion of coverage.”  Id.; see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:28-
1.1, Comm. Statement to Assembly, No. 3981--L.1983, c. 362, Introductory Statement. 
In light of the above, it is plain that the District Court correctly concluded that, 
although § 17:28-1.3 draws a distinction between in-state and out-of-state collisions, that 
classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.   
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
